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1. The Russian Electricity system 
1.1. Supply and demand 
The Russian Federation covers a vast land mass, nearly double the size of the United States, including eleven 
time zones and has a population of nearly 150 million people. However, much of the land is sparsely 
populated and the interconnected system is nearly all to the West of the Urals. The total installed electricity 
generating capacity in 2003 was 216GW, of which 69% was fossil-fuel fired (coal, oil or gas), 21% was 
hydropower and 10% was nuclear. In terms of generation, oil, gas and coal account for roughly 63% of 
Russia's electricity generation, followed by hydropower (21%) and nuclear (16%), reflecting the higher 
utilisation rates for nuclear plants than for fossil fuel plants. Amongst the fossil fuels, natural gas is the main 
generating fuel accounting for about two thirds of fossil fuel generation. Generation from other sources, e.g., 
renewables (excluding hydro) is negligible. 
Electricity demand has been growing at about 2% per year since 1999 but is still about 10% below the 
demand levels of 1992. In 2001, about 17% of electricity consumption was in the energy sector (oil, gas and 
coal). Of the energy supplied to final consumers, 52% was in the industrial sector, 23% was in the residential 
sector, with the rest split between commerce and public services (11%), transport (10%) and agriculture 
(4%). In part reflecting the size of the territory, distribution losses were high, representing 12% of domestic 
supply. 
Table 1 shows that production grew rapidly in the 1970s, more than 5% per year, but less rapidly in the 
1980s. From 1990 to 1998, production fell (by nearly a quarter) and by 2002 was still 18% below 1990 
levels. Nuclear power‟s contribution has increased from a very low level in 1970 to 7% in 1980, 11% in 
1990 and 16% in 2002, at the expense of thermal power. 
Table 1.  Electricity production and installed capacity 
                            Growth 
rate 
(%) 
                            1980 
  1970 1980 1990 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 To 
                            2002 
Electricity production (TWh)                             
       - Total 470 805 1082 957 876 860 847 834 827 846 862 886 892 0.5 
       - Thermal 373 622 797 663 601 583 583 567 564 563 568.5 576 578 -0.3 
       - Hydro 94 129 167 175 177 177 155 158 159 161 165.4 175 175 1.4 
       - Nuclear 4 54 118 119 98 100 109 109 104 122 129 135 140 4.3 
Capacity of electrical plants 
(GW(e)) 
                            
       - Total 105.1 165.4 213.3 213.4 214.9 215.0 214.5 214.2 214.1 214.3 204.5 214.9 214.9 1.2 
       - Thermal 81.3 121.1 149.7 148.8 149.7 149.7 149.2 149.0 148.7 148.3 138.9 148.5 148.5 1.0 
       - Hydro 23.0 35.1 43.4 43.4 44.0 44.0 44.0 43.9 44.1 44.3 44.4 44.2 44.2 1.1 
       - Nuclear 0.8 9.2 20.2 21.2 21.2 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.3 21.7 21.2 22.2 22.2 4.0 
1.2. The Networks 
The Russian electricity system comprises a number of networks. Most of the power is in the West 
comprising about 95% of generating capacity. This is divided into 6 interconnected power pools: 
 Central Power Pool (29.8 % of total capacity); 
 Siberia Power Pool (29 % of total capacity). 
 Ural Power Pool (16.5 % of total capacity); 
 Middle Volga Power Pool (10.3 % of total capacity); 
 North Caucasus Power Pool (5.5 % of total capacity); 
 Northwest Power Pool (4.4 % of total capacity). 
The Regional Electricity System "VOSTOK" operates separately from the main grid. It covers the far eastern 
part of Russia and consists of four Local Electricity Systems generating 41.0 TWh or 4.4% of total electricity 
generation in 2000. There is a limited amount energy exchange between the two main country systems. 
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There are five Isolated Local Electricity Systems, which are rather small and situated in remote regions 
where communication with the rest of the country is difficult. Despite their small size, they are clearly very 
important locally. In 2000, these systems generated 1.2 TWh or 0.1% of total electricity generation. 
1.3. RAO/UESR 
The industry structure is in transition following the announcement of structural reforms in 2003. The 
dominant company at present is RAO “UES (Unified Energy Systems) of Russia” or RAO UESR, which is, 
at present is 52.7% owned by the Russian Federation. As at December 31, 2003, the company had 352,074 
shareholders, with 43.9% held by legal persons and nominees and the rest by private individuals.1 The first 
shares in RAO UESR were issued in 1993 with a major issue in 1995. 
The Holding Company of RAO UESR is one of the three largest companies in Russia and is the largest 
employer in Russia with 577,600 employees in 2003. It owns 72.4% of the generating capacity and 96.1% of 
the total length of transmission lines (over 3 million kms of lines). RAO UESR oversees and has shares in 
the 73 regional electricity companies, known as „energos‟ (see Table 2). These companies generate 
electricity, operate the regional distribution networks and supply to final consumers. Table 3 shows the 
output of the ten largest generating Energos, which account for about 44% of RAO UESR‟s production. 
Federal thermal plants account for a further 16% of generation and federal hydro plants for 10%. Energos 
supplied about 60% of electricity sold in Russia. In 2003, RAO UESR employed an average of 577,600 
people compared to 632,000 in 2002 and 665,000 in 2001. 
Table 2.  RAO UESR ownership of energos 
% ownership Number 
100  9 
76-100  1 
51-75  9 
26-50  52 
0-25  2 
Source: http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/business/report2003/  
Table 3.  Output of the ten largest Energos, RAO UESR Federal Plants and Nuclear (2003) 
   Output (TWh) 
Mosenergo  75127 
Tyumenenergo  68315 
Sverdlovenergo  38886 
Kuzbassenergo  24878 
Samaraenergo  14007 
Orenburgenergo  13865 
Novosibirskenergo 12252 
Lenenergo  12421 
Chelyabenergo  8900 
Khabarovskenergo 8160 
Total large energos 276811 
Federal thermal plants 103070 
Federal hydro plants 63147 
Total RAO UESR production 635800 
Rosenergoatom  148618 
Total Russia production 916100 
Source: http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/business/report2003/ and http://eng.rosatom.ru/  
                                                     
1 Apart from the State, the major shareholders were Non-profit Partnership "National Depository Center" (as nominee) 
(14.0%), OAO "Savings Bank of the Russian Federation" ("Sberbank") (as nominee) (10.5%), ZAO "Depository 
Clearing Company" (as nominee) (7.2%) and ING BANK (EURASIA) ZAO (as nominee) (6.6%). 
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1.4. The nuclear sector 
Russia‟s 10 nuclear power stations are owned by Rosenergoatom, which is fully federally owned. It was set 
up in 1992 to own and operate 9 out of 10 of Russia‟s nuclear power plants, excluding the Leningrad plant 
(which was an important export earner selling power to Finland). In 2002, the company was reformed and 
the Leningrad plant was brought into Rosenergoatom as well as the plants under construction. It has a total 
operating capacity of about 21600MW of operating plants (30 units) with two units (each 1000MW) under 
construction  
Of the 10 sites, one, Bilibino, is sited in the far North East and is very small (44MW) supplying electricity 
and heat to mining industries and another, Beloyarsk is the site of a prototype fast breeder reactor. The other 
8 stations are all commercial facilities each with at least 1000MW of installed capacity in operation. About 
half the operating capacity is of the WWER design, comparable to the Western Pressurised Water Reactor 
(PWR), the most common design in the West. The other plants are of the RBMK design, the type used at the 
Chernobyl site. Plans to expand nuclear power have been severely scaled back after 1992 and only two units 
(one RBMK) are now under construction, both for 20 years or more. 
1.5. International trade 
Stagnant demand for power in Russia has allowed RAO UESR to develop a lucrative export market for 
power, both to the CIS countries and to Western Europe (see Table 4). In 2003, RAO UESR (with 60% of 
the shares) and Rosenergoatom (40%) formed a new company, ZAO “Inter RAO UES” to trade in power and 
in 2003 it exported 20.7TWh of power with revenue of US$485.3m. About 54% of the exports were to the 
Nordic market with the next largest customer Belarus accounting for about 17% of sales. A number of 
Russia‟s former partners, such as Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania 
have synchronised their electricity networks with those of the Western European network (UCTE) severing 
their ties with Russia and restricting trading opportunities for Russia. There is now an agreement between 
Russia and Europe to synchronise the Russian electricity grid to that of Western Europe and this will 
improve further prospects for exports of Russian power. 
Table 4.  Exports of power from Russia by ZAO 
  Net exports (GWh) 
CIS Countries 
Belarus  3532 
Georgia  866 
Kazakhstan 1793 
Moldova 879 
Ukraine  214 
Europe 
Latvia  761 
Finland  10993 
Norway  182 
China  162 
TOTAL  20700 
Source: http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/business/report2003/  
Note: Exports to Azerbaijan were routed through Georgia. 
1.6. Foreign investment 
So far, foreign investment in the Russian electricity industry has been negligible and with the collapse of the 
international activities of Western electric utilities, there seems little prospect that foreign investment will 
play a significant role at least for the next few years. 
One of the few foreign investors is Fortum, which in 2004, took a 30% share in Lenenergo (RAO UESR 
owns 49%). Given that the power exported to Finland from Russia is from this region, the motivation for 
Fortum is clear. 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
28/07/2010  Page 6 of 15  
  
ENEL has signalled its intention to bid for assets in Russia as they become available and was a member of a 
consortium given a contract in 2004 to manage a Russian power plant an 1800MW thermal power plant 
(North West), the first foreign company to win such a role 
1.7. Reforms 
A major restructuring of the Russian electricity industry began in 2003, expected to be complete by 2008. By 
then, it is projected that the structure of the industry will mirror that being imposed in Western Europe on its 
Member States by the European Union. This would require full corporate separation of monopoly network 
activities (the national high-voltage transmission network and the local and regional distribution networks) 
from electricity generation and retail supply to final consumers. The retail and generation businesses would 
become competitive with prices set by the market, while the network businesses would remain regulated 
monopolies. 
For the generation business, a competitive Wholesale Electricity Market comprising the European part of 
Russia, the Urals and Siberia (except for the isolated energy systems) would be created, while in the retail 
business, all consumers would be allowed to choose their retail supplier. 
1.7.1. Structure 
The structure that the reforms would attempt to create would be as follows: 
 Infrastructure companies. A Federal Grid Company would be created which would manage the 
Unified National Power Grid (UNPG). The System Operator, OAO "UES SO-CDA" would control 
the operational dispatch of the system, with powers to command generators; 
 Generation companies. Ten Wholesale Generating Companies (WGCs), would be spun off from 
RAO UESR and the Energos, six with thermal power plants and four with hydro plants. An 
unspecified number of Territorial Generating Companies would be created from the assets of the 
Energos; 
 Retail companies. Competitive Retail Companies will be established on the basis of retail units spun 
off in the course of regional Energos' restructuring. A number of Guarantee Suppliers would be 
created who would have an obligation to ensure uninterrupted supply of electricity to customers in 
the event of a competitive supplier. 
1.7.2. Timetable 
Reforms would take place in three phases: 2003 – early 2005; 2005-2006; and 2006-2008: 
 2003 – early 2005. In this phase, a competitive element of the wholesale market would be launched, 
establishment of the WGCs would begin with some being divested from RAO UESR, Energos 
would begin to be split into separate businesses and interregional transmission companies (ITCs) 
would be established with the transfer of transmission assets owned by the Energos to the ITCs; 
 2005-2006. In this phase, the competitive segment of wholesale electricity market would be 
expanded, territorial generation companies (TGCs) and interregional distribution companies (IDCs) 
would be established and establishment of WGCs would be completed;  
 2006-2008. In the final phase, operation of liberalised wholesale and retail markets would start and 
there would be an increase in the state's interest in the organization managing the Unified National 
Power Grid and the System Operator, but a reduction of the state's interest in WGCs and TGCs, 
where necessary. 
1.7.3. Progress 
A number of Energos have now completed restructuring and in mid-January 2005, 21 companies had 
restructured, generally into a generation company, a transmission company (generally known as an Energy 
Management Company) and a retail company. Work is underway to transfer to OAO "UES FGC" the 
property included in the Unified National Power Grid (UNPG). The setting up of the 10 WGCs has started 
with RAO UESR remaining the sole shareholder initially. Territorial Generation Companies and 
Interregional Distribution Companies are also in process of being set up. 
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The basic mechanism for the separation of companies from RAO UESR will be spin-off involving pro-rata 
distribution of shares. This mechanism entitles each shareholder in RAO UESR to a proportional interest in 
the newly established companies. 
Ultimate privatisation of the assets has long been planned but plans to sell off shares have continually been 
postponed. However, Gazprom has been active buying shares in the electrical sector taking 10.6% of RAO 
UESR and 25.01% of Mosenergo. 
The competitive market segment within the Federal Wholesale Electricity (Capacity) Market (FOREM) was 
launched on 1 November 2003 in the European part of Russia and Urals. Under the Rules of the Wholesale 
Electricity Market of the Transitional Period, energy providers may sell in the competitive market segment 
electricity generated with equipment making up to 15% of their working capacity. Buyers are able to 
purchase up to 30% of their planned energy consumption. Equilibrium nodal prices are set for each hour of 
the following day. 
The sellers were Rosenergoatom, 23 thermal power plants and 12 hydroelectric plants. The buyers were 68 
Energos, and 40 large consumers and electricity suppliers. As a result of this opening up, regulated electricity 
supply by Energos fell by 9% compared to 2002 as a result of several large industrial consumers entering the 
FOREM. 
Table 5.  Restructuring of Energos 
OAO Astrakhanenergo  OAO Astrakhan Regional Generation Company 
OAO Astrakhan Energy Management Company 
OAO Astrakhan Energy Retail Company 
OAO Lipetskenergo OAO Lipetsk Generation Company 
OAO Lipetsk Energy Management Company 
OAO Lipetsk Energy Retail Company 
OAO Rostovenergo OAO Rostov Generation Company 
OAO Rostovenergo Management Company 
OAO Energosbyt Rostovenergo 
OAO Ryazanenergo OAO Ryazan Heating Company 
OAO Ryazan Management Company 
OAO Ryazan Energy Retail Company 
OAO Tambovenergo OAO Tambov Generation Company 
OAO Tambov Energy Management Company 
OAO Tambov Energy Retail Company 
OAO Tverenergo OAO Tver Generation Company 
OAO Tver Management Energy Company 
OAO Tver Energy Retail Company 
OAO Tver Energy Repair Company 
OAO Yarenergo  OAO Yaroslavl Energy Company 
OAO Yaroslavl Management Energy Company 
OAO Yaroslavl Retail Company 
OAO Vladimirenergo  OAO Vladimir Generation Company 
OAO Vladimir Energy Retail Company 
OAO Volgogradenergo OAO Volzhskaya Generation Company 
OAO Volga-Don Energy Complex Management Company 
OAO Volgogradenergosbyt 
OAO Ivenergo  OAO Ivanovo Generation Company 
OAO Ivanovo Energy Retail Company 
OAO Karelenergo OAO Karelenergogeneratsiya 
OAO Karelenergo Management Company 
OAO Karelia Energy Retail Company 
OAO Kostromaenergo OAO Kostroma Generation Company 
OAO Kostroma Retail Company 
OAO Marienergo OAO Mari Regional Generation Company 
OAO Mari Regional Management Company 
OAO Marienergosbyt 
OAO Penzaenergo OAO Penza Generation Company 
OAO Penza Energy Management Company 
PSIRU  University of Greenwich  www.psiru.org 
28/07/2010  Page 8 of 15  
  
OAO Penza Energy Retail Company 
OAO Penza Energy Repair Company 
OAO Udmurtenergo OAO Udmurt Territorial Generation Company 
OAO Udmurt Management Energy Company 
OAO Udmurt Energy Retail Company 
OAO Chuvashenergo OAO Chuvash Generation Company 
OAO Chuvash Management Company 
OAO Chuvash Energy Retail Company 
OAO Cheboksarskaya HPP 
OAO Bryanskenergo OAO Bryansk Energy Management Company 
OAO Bryansk Retail Company 
OAO Bryansk Generation Company 
OAO Belgorodenergo OAO Belgorod Retail Company 
OAO Belgorod Heat Energy Company 
1.7.4. Re-organisation of Energos 
By January 11 2005, 21 regional energos had largely completed separation by lines of business. No details 
have been published for three of these, Pskovenergo, Kalugenergo and Voronezhenergo. The businesses for 
which split-up details have been published are shown in Table 5. 
1.8. New investments 
For the future, RAO UESR is looking to reduce the investment burden on its own resources by wider use of 
borrowed funds, and use of external investors. The investment programme for 2004 (see Table 6) called for 
investment of RUB93.5bn (about US$3.4bn) and was primarily directed at thermal and hydro electric power 
plants with completion of 1258MW of new plants projected. 
Table 6.  Investment Program of RAO UESR Holding Company for 2004  
 
 Investments, RUB billion* 
 
Total for RAO UESR Holding Company  93.5  
including  
AO-power plants 9.5  
Regional Energos 54.8  
RAO UESR 15.1  
OAO UES FGC 13.4  
OAO UES SO-CDA 0.7  
* Without taking into account borrowed funds.  
1.9. International activities of RAO UESR 
RAO UESR has been a bidder in a number of privatisations in the past year: 
 In January 2005, it was one of 12 companies bidding to buy three power plants in Bulgaria and it 
also bid unsuccessfully for a stake in the Bulgarian grid; 
 It was an unsuccessful bidder for a two thirds stake in the Slovak electric utility, Slovenske 
Elektrarne (SE) – ENEL of Italy was the successful bidder; 
 RAO UESR has been discussing with the Moldovan and Georgian governments the possibility of 
investing in those countries; and 
 RAO UESR plans to bid for stakes in Ukrainian distribution companies 
Before 2004, it had acquired assets in Georgia (power plants sold by AES of USA), Armenia (shares in 5 
hydro stations and ownership for five years of the nuclear power station) and Kazakhstan. 
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1.10. Relations with the European Commission 
The European Union has for some years been trying to establish relations with Russia, but with little 
concrete success. Negotiations on a European Energy Charter were begun in 1990. Broadly, the Charter was 
intended to smooth investment by Western countries in Russia, in return for access to Russian fossil fuels. 
Use of Western money to improve the safety of Russian designed reactors was also an important element. 
However, progress on this was slow and has stalled for the last 10 years. A Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement (PCA) signed by Russia and the EU (in force since 1997) was a forum to set up cooperation in 
areas of common interest and resulted in the launch of an „energy dialogue‟ in 2000. 
Factors behind this dialogue included the decision by Russia to join the WTO and the joining of the EU by 
eight countries from central and eastern Europe. It is difficult to identify precise results, but the Commission 
claims that difficulties for Russian companies investing in the EU (e.g. Gazprom) and difficulties for EU 
companies investing in Russia have been smoothed (e.g., BP Shell etc). 
The Commission claims as specific benefits: 
 The ability to sign long-term contracts for gas and the removal of restrictions on imports of 
hydrocarbons from Russia to EU countries; 
 The signing by Russia of the Kyoto Protocol; 
 The launching of energy efficiency projects; 
 Easier trade in energy products; 
 The proposed connection (synchronisation) of the Russian electricity network with that of Western 
Europe 
How significant these achievements are and how far they can be attributed to the PCA is hard to determine. 
However, most of the achievements are relevant to hydrocarbons rather than the electricity sector, although 
the proposed reforms of the Russian electricity industry will largely bring it in line with the requirements of 
the Commission‟s Electricity Directive (EC/2003/54/EC). The synchronisation of the Russian grid with that 
of most of Western Europe (the UCTE system) is the subject of a joint study by the EU and Russia. The 
study is expected to report in 2006, although there is a possibility the timetable will be brought forward by a 
year. 
1.11. Politics of reform 
There has been recent opposition in Russia to some liberalization reforms, such as the demonstrations by 
pensioners against the replacement of benefits in kind (such as energy) with less valuable cash payments.  
On the other hand there is very strong international pressure for the liberalisation of the electricity sector. It 
is seen as an extremely large investment opportunity for foreign companies and banks, and so potential 
foreign investors are supportive of the reform programme and concerned at signs that it may slow down. 
The president of the EBRD, M. Lemierre, said in January 2005 that Russia “could send positive signals to 
investors” by resuming the restructuring of RAO UESR, which was suspended in summer 2004. 
1.12. Policy issues for the Russian electricity sector 
There would appear to be three main priority issues for the Russian electricity sector for the next few years: 
the fate of the nuclear sector; foreign investment in the electricity sector; and the proposed entry to the 
European Union. 
1.12.1. The nuclear sector 
Russia has eight main civil nuclear power stations (excluding prototype or small units) comprising 25 units 
at Balakovo (4 units), Kalinin (2 units), Kola (4 units), Kursk (4 units), Leningrad (4 units) Novovoronezh (3 
units), Smolensk (3 units) and Rostov (1 unit). There are units reported to be under construction at Rostov, 
Kursk and Kalinin. Of the operating units, 8 (those at Balakovo, Kalinin, Rostov and one at Novovoronezh) 
are of the VVER-1000 design and 4 units of the VVER-440/213 design (those at Kola). These designs are 
not regarded by the West as priorities for early closure. There are two first generation VVER-440 units (at 
Novovoronezh) and 11 units of the RBMK design (Leningrad, Kursk and Smolensk). There are two VVER-
1000 units under construction (Rostov and Kalinin) and one RBMK (Kursk). 
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Russia has resisted pressure to close the plants characterized as being „unsafe‟, indeed, it has refurbished the 
Leningrad RBMK station with the expectation that it will be able to run for at least another decade. Russia 
has generally not opened its plants to international quality inspections and it has not been amenable to 
pressure from the West to close plants the West regards as unsafe. The Russian nuclear industry is still very 
active building plants in China, India, Iran, Ukraine as well as Russia. These comprise half the world 
capacity of nuclear plants under construction. There are also part-built units in Cuba, Libya, Ukraine, Slovak 
Republic and Bulgaria that are not currently active. 
Closer ties with the European Union are likely to bring pressure to close the „unsafe‟ plants, representing 
more than half of Russia‟s nuclear capacity. 
1.12.2. Foreign investment 
There has so far been minimal foreign investment in the Russian electricity sector. The scale of the market 
and the natural resources that Russia possesses, especially the natural gas would make Russia an attractive 
place to invest in some respects, but Russia would still be regarded as a high risk place to invest and it seems 
unlikely that much of Russia‟s investment needs in the electricity sector would be met by foreign capital. 
1.12.3. Proposed entry to the European Union 
Russia has begun a programme of radical restructuring of the electricity sector, breaking up the oblenergos 
into network, retail and generation companies and creating at least 10 Wholesale Generating Companies and 
a number of Regional Generating Companies. Retail competition would be introduced for all consumers, 
currently planned for 2006-8 and a wholesale market established. This would bring Russia into line, at least 
in principle, with the EU Electricity Directive. However, it remains to be seen whether such a large number 
of new companies can be established and whether the logistical steps for retail competition can be carried out 
in time. 
However, the more important issue is whether the model underlying the Directive is suitable for Russia. 
There are concerns on at least four grounds; 
 Retail competition. Retail competition has proved expensive to introduce, for example, cost UK 
small consumers about £300m per year (more than £10 per consumer) and has resulting in a 
significant widening of the price differential between large consumers and residential consumers 
resulting from the much stronger negotiating power of large consumers; 
 Wholesale competition. Most wholesale markets in Europe have minimal liquidity and the 
published prices have little value as market signals. Most power is bought and sold on long-term 
contracts or is bought by integrated generation retail companies generating for their own consumers, 
thereby bypassing the visible wholesale market; 
 Oligopolies. Most countries have seen little real competition with the markets dominated usually by 
a monopoly or duopoly. National governments appear to prefer to allow strong home companies to 
have a strong national base with little competition to allow them to expand into foreign markets; 
 Reliability. Most countries that have liberalised their electricity industry have seen large reductions 
in the workforce. This and the lack of control of how much generating capacity there is has led to 
concern that liberalisation will lead to a poorer standard of supply security if networks are not 
properly maintained and there is insufficient generating capacity. 
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2. The Ukrainian electricity system 
2.1. Supply and demand 
Table 7 shows that electricity demand in the Ukraine more than doubled in the 1960s and grew by 5% a year 
during the 1970s, but only grew by less than 2.5% a year in the 1980s. Since 1990, demand declined sharply 
and in 2001 was 43% lower than in 1990. In 2001, thermal power production was only 40% of the level of 
1990 with substantial implications for coal demand, especially from Ukrainian mines. 
Ukrainian nuclear power plants generated 87TWh of electrical energy in 2004, 6.9 percent more than in 
2003. The share of nuclear power facilities in Ukraine's total electrical energy output was 48%. 
Table 7.  Electricity production and installed capacity 
                                     
   1960 1970 1980 1990 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
                                       
Electricity production (TWh)                                     
       - Total 53.9 137.6 236.0 298.5 202.9 194.0 183.0 178.0 172.8 172.1 171.4 173.0 
       - Thermal 49.9 126.0 208.4 211.7 120.5 113.4 94.6 88.6 81.7 81.7 82.6 84.6 
       - Hydro 4.0 11.6 13.4 10.7 12.3 10.1 8.8 10.0 15.9 14.5 11.5 12.2 
       - Nuclear 0.0 0.0 14.2 76.1 68.85 70.5 79.6 79.4 75.2 75.9 77.3 76.2 
       - Imports N/A N/A -17.5 -28.5 -1.0 -3.0 -2.0 -0.2 -0.7 -3.4 -3.8 -3.1 
       - Gross Domestic Consumption N/A N/A 218.5 270 201.9 191.0 181.0 177.8 172.1 168.7 167.6 169.9 
       - Distribution Losses N/A N/A 19.2 21.9 21.7 18.8 25.0 28.4 30 30.2 31.2 34.1 
       - Final Consumption N/A N/A 199.3 248.1 180.2 172.2 156.0 149.4 142.1 138.5 136.4 135.8 
 Capacity of electrical plants (GW(e))                                     
       - Total 11.7 27.9 43.9 55.6 55.2 53.9 54.0 53.9 53.8 53.9 53.8 52.8 
       - Thermal 9.9 25.4 37.4 37.1 37.7 35.4 35.7 36.5 36.3 36.4 36.3 36.3 
       - Hydro 1.8 2.5 4.0 4.71 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.7 4.7 
       - Nuclear 0.0 0.0 2.44 13.8 12.8 13.8 13.6 12.7 12.8 12.8 12.8 11.8 
After the break up of the Soviet Union, the Ukrainian electricity sector experienced severe problems for the 
next 6 years, for three main reasons. First, the Ukrainian economy suffered severe recession with recorded 
GDP falling to less than 40% of the level of 1990; second, the 1986 Chernobyl disaster was a major 
limitation on policy; and third, various attempts at reforms and restructuring of the electricity sector proved 
unsuccessful. 
2.2. Economic decline 
The decline in GDP2 led to a sharp reduction in demand for electricity and also affected the ability of 
consumers to pay for their power. Demand for electricity fell by about a third in that period and by 1998, 
only about 10% of electricity consumption was paid for with cash. Most was paid for by barter and more 
than 10% was not paid for at all.3 This led to a chronic cash shortage for the industry and despite having an 
installed capacity equal to about double peak demand, electricity supplies became unreliable because there 
was not enough money to buy the fuel and the plant spares necessary to run the plants, especially the fossil 
fuel-fired plants. As a result, interconnections with other countries, especially Russia, were broken and the 
Ukrainian system ran as an island for long periods, further reducing the reliability and the stability of 
supplies. 
However, from 1999 onwards, the Ukrainian economy has grown at a very rapid rate. Annual growth rates in 
the years 2000-2003 was 6%, 9%, 4.1% and 8.2%4 and 2004 figures are expected to show growth of 12%. 
While this has led to GDP nearly doubling in only 5 years, it leaves output at only about 60% of 1992 levels. 
                                                     
2 Measurement of GDP became very difficult in the 1990s because of the increasing part played by unrecorded 
activities so the official figures for GDP are likely to overstate the extent of the economic decline 
3 http://www.antenna.nl/wise/index.html?http://www.antenna.nl/wise/507/4991.html  
4 Financial Times, January 7, p 38. 
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Electricity demand has not rebounded so strongly, probably because the old electricity intensive industries 
that closed after 1990 have been replaced by much less electric-intensive activities. 
2.3. The Chernobyl disaster 
The Chernobyl disaster left Ukraine with serious clean-up problem and from 1995 onwards, there has been 
uncertainty about how the West would help Ukraine deal with the problem. The Chernobyl plant comprised 
four 1000MW units. One was destroyed in the accident and a second unit was near the end of its operating 
life and was closed in 1996. The other two units were closed in 1999 and 2000. An agreement between 
Ukraine and the G7 seemed to provide for Western funding (through the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, EBRD) to complete two part-built Russian designed plants (of a different technology), 
Khmelnitski 2 and Rovno 4 (often termed K2/R4), but this was not forthcoming and the units were 
completed in 2004 using other funds. The EBRD is however funding safety upgrades which it is hoped will 
bring the plants up to a better level of safety. 
2.4. Industry structure 
The dramatic decline in electricity demand has left nuclear power as the dominant source of electricity in 
Ukraine. In 1992, it accounted for less than a third of electricity generation with most of the rest thermal 
power (gas and coal) and hydro less than 10%. However, one new 1000MW unit was completed in 1995 and 
as demand has fallen, the sources with the lowest marginal costs have been retained (hydro and nuclear) and 
in 2003, 45% of electricity was nuclear, about 10% hydro and the rest thermal. The completion of two more 
nuclear units in 2004 is likely to mean that more than half of Ukraine‟s electricity generation will be nuclear. 
Total installed capacity is about 55GW but in 2003, these plants only generated 167TWh, a utilization rate of 
only about a third.  
Various programmes of restructuring have been attempted but there has been little interest by Western 
companies and much of the sector remains in public hands. In June 2004, the Ukraine government 
consolidated its holdings in energy companies in a new company, Energeticheskaya (Energy) Company 
(EKU). 
2.4.1. Generators 
The most important generating company is the state-owned Energoatom, which owns nearly 15GW of 
nuclear plants contributing about half of Ukraine‟s electricity (see Table 8). Three further units each of 
1000MW are reported to be under construction, although it is far from clear whether these will be completed. 
Table 8.  Electricity generation companies in Ukraine 
  % State-ownership via EKU Capacity (GW) 
Energoatom 100    15 
Donbassenergo 86    n.a. 
Zakhidenergo 70    4.7 
Tsentrenergo 78    7.6 
Dniprenergo 76    8.2 
Ukrhydroenergo 100    4.6 
Kievenergo 50    1.2 
Note: EKU ownership was as at the time of its establishment in June 2004. Energoatom is owned directly by the State 
The thermal plants are owned mainly by four generating companies, Donbassenergo, Zakhidenergo, 
Tsentrenergo, and Dniproenergo, with a total capacity of about 36GW. A number of attempts have been 
made to sell these companies, but the State still has majority shares in all of them. 
Donbassenergo was the largest of these until 2001, when three out of its five power stations were sold to 
unidentified owners to clear debts, but the government still owns 85.8% of the shares of the remainder of the 
company. Zakhidenergo owns 4.7GW of plant and is 70.1% owned by the State, Tsentrenergo owns 7.6GW 
of plant and is 78% owned by the State and Dniproenergo owns 8.2GW of plant and is 92% State-owned. 
Until 2004, the hydro capacity was owned by two State-owned companies, Dniprohydroenergo and 
Dniesterhydroenergo, but these were merged to form Ukrhydroenergo with a total capacity of 4.6GW. 
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Another important company is Kievenergo, which generates all the power and supplies all the heat to Kiev 
and employs 18,000 people. The state owns 50% + 1 of the shares, with 12.7% of the shares owned by the 
municipal authorities, the rest being held mainly by small investors. It owns 1200MW of generating plant 
and operates over 4000km of heat pipelines. 
2.4.2. Distribution companies 
There are 27 distribution companies, or „oblenergos‟ (see Table 9). AES acquired controlling stakes in two 
of these, Kyivoblenergo and Rivneoblenergo, in 2001. AES paid about US$45.9m for the 75% stake in 
Kyivoblenergo and US$23.2m for the 75% interest in Rivneoblenergo. The remaining 25% interests in both 
companies are either publicly traded or owned by employees. The holdings are part of the AES Silk Road 
subsidiary which controls AES‟s businesses in Eurasia. AES has sold most of its non-US investments in the 
past two years and in May 2003, it was negotiating to sell its stakes to Vacuna International5 registered in 
Luxembourg, but it appears that for the time being, AES is not planning to sell its shares. 
Table 9.  Electricity distribution companies in Ukraine 
Energo   Consumers Owners (%) 
Kyivoblenergo  763,000  AES (75) 
Rivneoblenergo  383,000  AES (75) 
Zhytomyroblenergo 525,000  VSE (75.6) 
Sevastopolmiskenergo 137,000  VSE (70) 
Khersonoblenergo 594,000  VSE (65) 
Kirovogradoblenergo 479,000  VSE (51) 
Zaporozhyeoblenergo   RAO UESR, EKU (60) 
Luganskoblenergo   RAO UESR, EKU (60) 
Lvovoblenergo    RAO UESR, EKU (27) 
Nikolaevoblenergo   RAO UESR, EKU (70) 
Poltavaoblenergo    RAO UESR, EKU (25 + 1) 
Prikarpatyeoblenergo   RAO UESR, EKU (25) 
Sumyoblenergo    RAO UESR, EKU (25 + 1) 
Ternopoloblenergo   RAO UESR, EKU (51) 
Chernigovoblenergo   RAO UESR, EKU (25 + 1) 
Odessaoblenergo    EKU (25) 
Vinnitsaoblenergo   EKU (75) 
Volynoblenergo    EKU (75) 
Zakarpattyaoblenergo   EKU (75) 
Dniproobleenergo   EKU (75) 
Khmelnitskobleenergo   EKU (70) 
Krymenergo    EKU (70) 
Kharkhivenergo    EKU (65) 
Donetskoblenergo   EKU (65) 
Cherkassyoblenergo   EKU (46) 
Chernovtsyoblenergo   EKU (70) 
Ivano-Frankiskoblenergo    
Note: EKU ownership was as at the time of its establishment in June 2004. 
At the same time as AES bought its stakes, the state-owned Slovak distribution company, Vychodoslovenske 
Energeticke Zavody (VSE), bought majority stakes in four oblenergos, Zhytomyroblenergo, 
Sevastopolmiskenergo, Khersonoblenergo and Kirovogradoblenergo. In March 2002, VSE transferred the 
shares to a subsidiary, VS Energy, registered in Netherlands in which it has a 90% stake. In January 2004, 
Vacuna International was negotiating to buy this stake, but the deal was not completed. In 2002, RWE, the 
German utility, acquired a 49% stake in VSE and subsequently Slovak law was changed to allow a majority 
stake to be taken in VSE (and the other Slovak distributors). It is expected RWE will take up this 
opportunity. 
In November 2003, the state-owned Russian electric utility, RAO UESR, announced it had taken stakes of at 
least 16 in 10 oblenergos, although generally the stakes were less than controlling ones. It also said it 
                                                     
5 It is not clear who is backing Vacuna. Vacuna International S.A. was described in the press as a holding company set 
up to manage assets. The company is also said to be active on the international financial and capital markets. 
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planned to increase these stakes by buying the government holdings in these companies to gain controlling 
stakes, but Ukraine refused to allow this while a majority of shares in RAO UESR were held by the Russian 
government.  
2.4.3. Trade in power 
Ukraine has for some time been attempting to increase exports of power, particularly to Western Europe (see 
Table 10). In 2003, the western part of Ukraine, so called "Burshtyn Island" upgraded its system according to 
UCTE (the system that supplies most of Western Europe) requirements and, after a successful one-year trial 
operation, the permanent synchronous connection was approved by UCTE in September 2003. This allows 
Ukraine to trade directly with Poland, Hungary and the Slovak Republic via links with a capacity of 450MW. 
There are plans to increase this capacity to 550MW by 2008. 
Most of the Ukrainian system is synchronised to the Russian system. In December 2004, the commissioning 
of the Khmelnitsky 2 and Rovno 4 nuclear power plants (each 1000MW) allowed Energoatom to sign a deal 
with RAO UESR to export up to 500GWH per month (the equivalent to the output of a 700MW plant) to 
Russia at US$11.4/MWh. Russia exports power to Moldova via the Ukrainian grid. Despite the completion 
of the two new nuclear units, exports of power in 2004 were 2% lower in 2004 compared to 2003, possibly 
due to the unscheduled shut-down of a number of nuclear plants in 2004. 
Table 10.  Net electricity exports from Ukraine to UCTE countries (2003) 
  Net trade (GWh) 
Hungary  4538 
Poland  818 
Slovak Rep -1255 
Total  4101 
2.5. Policy issues for the Ukraine electricity sector 
There would appear to be four main priority issues for the Ukrainian electricity sector for the next few years: 
the fate of the nuclear sector; improving the level of electricity bill payment; foreign investment in the 
electricity sector; and the proposed entry to the European Union. 
2.5.1. The nuclear sector 
Ukraine now has four nuclear power stations, Khmelnitski (2 units), Rovno (4 units), South Ukraine (3 units) 
and Zaporozhe (6 units). These units are of the VVER-1000 type or the VVER-440/213 design (two units at 
Rovno). The VVER design is similar to the Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR), the most widely used design 
in the West. The closure of the Chernobyl site (which housed four reactors of the RBMK design) means that 
none of the operating reactors are now of the type that the West has characterised as a priority for early 
closure and all the operating units should be able to operate to at least 2020 (assuming a lifetime of at least 
40 years). Paying for the continued clean-up and surveillance at the Chernobyl site will require significant 
resources, some of which may be provided by the West. 
The Khmelnitski 2 and Rovno 4 (K2R4) units were completed in 2004 and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) may provide loans for the safety of these units to be upgraded to 
Western standards. Work on three further units (two at Khmelnitski and one at South Ukraine) has been 
started but has been stalled since 1990 with less than 30% of the work reported to have been completed on 
the furthest advanced plant (Khmelnitski 3). It has been reported work would now resume on Khmelnitski 3 
but it remains to be seen whether this will happen. Work on the unit at South Ukraine is highly unlikely to 
restart on environmental grounds. 
Ukraine already has a large surplus of capacity so completion of further nuclear plants would need to be 
justified on grounds other than capacity need, for example, reducing the cost of generation, allowing exports 
of power or replacing old capacity to reduce environmental impacts. In the election campaign, the new 
President, Victor Yushchenko, criticised the closure of the Chernobyl plants, mainly on grounds that the 
West did not provide support for their closure that it had promised. However, it is not clear whether he will 
support resumption of construction of Khmelnitski 3. 
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2.5.2. Improving the level of payment 
At its worst in 1998, the level of payment of electricity bills in cash was less than 10% with 77% paid by 
barter and the rest not paid at all. However, substantial efforts to improve payment rates coupled with 
economic recovery have led to a substantial improvement in this level. The level of payment by utilities grew 
from 80.6% in January through October 2003 to 89.2% in January though October 2004. Further 
improvements are expected although it is not clear whether tariff increases, which would tend to reduce the 
ability of consumers to pay, will be needed. 
2.5.3. Foreign investment 
The prospects for further foreign investment in the electricity sector are very limited, with the notable 
exception of investment from Russia. Of the existing investors, AES did appear to be contemplating 
withdrawal in 2003, but at present they do not appear to have plans to sell. However, policies in this area can 
change quickly and it cannot be assumed that AES will continue to support its Ukrainian subsidiaries. 
Equally, the companies taken over by the Slovak company, VSE are now owned by the German company, 
RWE (which took a stake in VSE in 2002) and it is not clear whether these investments figure in RWE‟s 
strategic planning. 
RAO UESR has invested in Ukraine, although the published details are sketchy and it is clear that there is a 
strong strategic and political incentive for Russia to invest in Ukraine. However, the fate of RAO UESR is 
unclear and it may not have the resources or the scope to expand its investments in Ukraine. It is not clear 
what policies the new President will follow on privatisation, in particular whether investment from Russia 
will be welcomed. 
2.5.4. Proposed entry to the European Union 
President Yushchenko has strongly affirmed his commitment to take Ukraine into the European Union. 
Clearly this could not happen for several years, but as a condition of entry, Ukraine would have to comply 
with European rules on the electricity sector. If the current Directive is still in force, this would require, 
amongst other things, that all consumers should be able to choose their electricity supplier and that the 
owners of the transmission and distribution networks should be legally separate from generators or retail 
suppliers. Such a radical restructuring would be highly controversial and, if experience in the EU is anything 
to go by, would lead to substantial reductions in employment, a transfer of costs from large industrial 
consumers to residential consumers (because small consumers do not have strong bargaining power 
compared to large users) and could jeopardise security of supply. 
